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 Abstract 
Especially in developing countries credit constraints are often perceived as one of the most 
important market frictions constraining firm innovation and growth. Huge amounts of public 
money are being devoted to the removal of such constraints but their effectiveness is still 
subject to an intense policy debate. This paper contributes to this debate by analysing the 
effects of the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) loans. It finds that, before receiving 
BNDES support, granted firms are indeed more credit constrained than comparable non-
granted firms. It also finds that BNDES support allows granted firms to achieve the same 
level of performance as similar non-granted firms that are not credit constrained. However, it 
does not allow granted firms to outperform similar non-granted ones. 
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1. Introduction
Large emerging economies, such as Brazil, China and India, are considered the 
markets of the future as promising destinations for sales as well as worrying origins of 
new tough competitors. At the same time, firms from those countries feel they are not 
able to compete on a level playing field with firms from more advanced economies due 
to all sorts of market failures. In particular, credit constraints are often perceived one of 
the most important market frictions constraining innovation, growth and performance as 
they hamper the entrepreneurial efforts of local firms. While huge amounts of public 
money are being devoted to the removal of such constraints, their effectiveness is still 
subject to an intense policy debate. 
The aim of this paper is to contribute to this debate by investigating the case of 
Brazil. The Brazilian government provides long-term loans through the Banco Nacional 
de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social (henceforth, BNDES), a development bank 
whose main statutory goal is to improve Brazilian economic competitiveness without 
neglecting broader social and environmental aspects. BNDES invests in several areas 
including research and development, infrastructure, export support, regional and urban 
development. More specifically, in the case of manufacturing, BNDES finances long-
term projects aimed at the creation of new plants, the enlargement of existing ones, the 
restructuring and the modernization of production processes, innovation and 
technological development, export promotion. Overall, the importance of BNDES in the 
Brazilian economy is quite sizeable: in 2012 its disbursements reached the value of R$ 
156 billion (or US$ 76 billion), representing 20% of aggregate investment.1 When 
compared with that of other development banks, the size of BNDES financing becomes 
even more impressive. For instance, in 2012 the World Bank and the Inter-American 
Development Bank disbursed 19.8 and 6.9 billion dollars respectively.2 In comparison, 
BNDES financing reached nearly three times their combined disbursements. 
1 Information accessed on May 29th, 2014 at 
http://www.bndes.gov.br/SiteBNDES/bndes/bndes_en/Institucional/The_BNDES_in_Numbers/ 
2 According to WB (2013) and IADB (2013). 
Even though BNDES project analysis involves several dimensions including 
social and environmental aspects, this paper focuses on the assessment of the overall 
impact on the competitiveness of Brazilian firms. Do BNDES loans help relax credit 
constraints that hamper the innovativeness and productivity of Brazilian firms? We 
address this question by analysing micro-data drawn from a variety of sources: the 
Annual Industrial Research (Pesquisa Industrial Anual – [PIA]) of the Brazilian 
Institute of Geography and Statistics (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística – 
[IBGE]); the Annual Social Information Report (Relação Anual de Informações Sociais 
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– [RAIS]) of the Ministry of Labour; the Foreign Trade Secretary (Secretaria de
Comércio Exterior – [SECEX]) of the Ministry of  Industrial Development and Foreign 
Trade; the Foreign Capital Census and the Central Bank Register of Brazilian Capital 
Abroad of the Brazilian Central Bank; BNDES itself. 
 While there is an increasing literature evaluating government policies for 
business support (Bronzini and Blasio, 2006), there is a relative shortage of papers on 
the specific impact of government policies on firms’ productivity (see, e.g., Griliches, 
Klette and Moen, 2000; Criscuolo, Martin, Overman and Reenen, 2007). This is not due 
to a shortage of methods, since other areas have already developed different ways to 
deal with the issue. An example can be found in the literature of labour economics that 
evaluates to what extent government polices affect individuals’ achievements 
(Heckman, LaLonde and Smith, 1999). The role of credit constraints for innovation and 
growth has been stressed mainly in the development literature. Banerjee and Duflo 
(2005) provide evidence that firms in many developing countries face credit constraints, 
using a sample of countries which includes Brazil. More specifically, Terra (2003), 
Aldrighi and Bisinha (2010) and Ambrozio, Faleiros, Sant’Anna and Sousa (2013) 
provide evidence that Brazilian firms are credit constrained by investigating this issue at 
the firm level. In the case of Brazil, Coelho and Sousa (2010) present a review of all 
recent studies using evaluation techniques investigating BNDES support on firm 
performance. In total, six papers address whether firm productivity is related to BNDES 
loans. However, the majority of them evaluate only labour productivity. These include 
De Negri, De Negri and Alves (2008), Coelho and De Negri (2010) and Araújo, Esteves 
and De Negri (2010), which investigates effects of any BNDES’ loans on firm 
performance, including those loans not aimed at improving productivity. Ribeiro and De 
Negri (2009) and Coelho and De Negri (2010) look at both labour productivity and 
Total Factor Productivity (TFP), but the former focus on a specific loan allotted to 
acquisition of domestic capital goods whereas the latter analyse any BNDES loan.   
Closer to the spirit of the present paper, Ottaviano and Sousa (2008) and Sousa 
(2013) investigate the relationship between firms' performance and BNDES loans 
allocated to the modernization and enlargement of existing plants or to the creation of 
new ones. Both those papers look only at labour productivity, while this paper uses not 
only labour productivity but also TFP. Another feature that distinguishes the present 
paper from the others is the design of an estimation strategy that not only uses different 
sets of counterfactual groups but also tests whether granted firms faces tougher credit 
restriction.  
Overall, we find that granted firms were more credit constrained than 
comparable non-granted firms before receiving BNDES support. In addition, such 
support allowed granted firms to achieve the same level of performance as similar firms 
that were not credit constrained, but not to outperform them. These findings have two 
main policy implications. First, government support such as that provided by BNDES 
can indeed help relaxing credit constraints that prevent constrained firms to perform as 
otherwise identical unconstrained ones. Second, for better firm performance, financial 
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support should come together with initiatives that incentivise firms to implement their 
projects using frontier technologies. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a theoretical framework to 
inform the subsequent empirical analysis. Financial support offered by BNDES to 
manufacturers is detailed in Section 3. Section 4 introduces the data together with 
alternative ‘treatment’ and ‘control’ groups that one can use to assess the impact of 
BNDES support. Credit constraints are investigated in Section 5, while Section 6 looks 
at the impact of BNDES support on firm performance. Section 7 concludes. 
2. Theoretical framework
Consider a firm that has a portfolio of projects and has to decide which projects to 
implement. Projects differ in terms of efficiency φ>0 and their implementation 
generates imperfectly substitutable outputs.  
The firm faces a perceived demand for the output of any of its projects with 
constant price elasticity equal to σ>1 such that 
   pAq  (1) 
where q is quantity demanded, p is price, and A is aggregate demand, which the firm 
takes as given. 
A project can be implemented only after incurring a fixed investment cost. 
Production also faces a constant marginal cost, which depends on the efficiency of the 
project and the type of technology adopted for production. There are two types of 
technologies available, ‘old’ and ‘new’, and they differ in terms of both fixed and 
marginal costs. Specifically, the old technology requires a smaller initial investment but 
is also less effective: its fixed cost is lower but, for a given level of project efficiency, 
its marginal cost is higher. All this is captured by total cost 
SNTqcfTC TTT ,,   (2) 
where fT is the fixed investment cost and cT/φ is the marginal production cost. All the 
rest given, higher project efficiency (larger φ) maps into lower marginal cost (higher 
‘productivity’). T is an index of technology, which equals N and S in the case of new 
and old technologies respectively. Hence, we have fN>fS and cN<cS. 
Profit maximization with constant demand elasticity requires the firm to set its 
price for the output of a project with efficiency φ as a constant mark-up over marginal 
cost:   
  
 TT cp 1)(  (3) 
This price then determines output, revenue and profit as: 
  TTTTTTT fpApArpAq     /)()(,)()(,)()( 11  (4) 
As σ is larger than one, results (3) and (4) show that, for a given technology, a more 
efficient project leads to lower price, larger output, larger revenue and larger profit. As 
the firm chooses the technology that generates more profit net of fixed cost, higher 
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project efficiency, therefore, fosters its adoption. Moreover, as the fixed cost is higher 
for the new technology, higher project efficiency also fosters implementation through 
the new technology.  
Specifically, there are two threshold efficiency levels, φS and φN (with φN>φS), 
that determine whether the project is implement or not and, if implemented, which 
technology is adopted. For efficiency below φS, neither the old technology nor the new 
technology break even as output from the project is too small to cover the fixed 
investment cost. For efficiency above φN, output is large enough not only to cover the 
fixed investment cost of the old technology but also to fruitfully exploit the new 
technology notwithstanding its larger fixed investment cost. For efficiency between φS 
and φN, output is still large enough to offset the fixed investment cost of the old 
technology but not large enough to cover the larger fixed investment cost of the new 
technology. Hence, projects with φ<φS are not implemented; project with φ>φN are 
implemented through the new technology; projects with φS<φ<φN are implemented 
through the old technology. 
 Formally, φS is such that 0)( SS  : for φ=φS the firm is indifferent between 















Analogously, the cutoff for the adoption of the new technology φN is such that 
)()( NNNS   : for φ=φN the firm is indifferent between the two technologies. Using
















with φN>φS if (fN/fS)>(cS/cN)σ-1 which is assumed to hold so that the new technology does 
not always dominate the old technology whenever the firm decides to implement the 
project.    
Credit constraints on the implementation of projects and the adoption of 
technologies can be introduced in this framework by assuming that they increase the 
costs of the required initial investments. Vice versa, interventions that relax credit 
constraints can be thought of as implying smaller fixed investment costs fS and fN. 
Inspecting (5) and (6) reveals that smaller fS and fN reduce both φS and φN, thus 
increasing the share of projects that are implemented. As for technology adoption, credit 
constraints may affect the two fixed investment costs asymmetrically. For instance, if 
they affected disproportionately the adoption of the new technology, their relaxation 
would decrease fN more than fS, increasing the relative number of projects implemented 
through the more efficient new technology and thus improving firm productivity. On the 
contrary, if credit constraints affected disproportionately the adoption of the old 
technology, their relaxation would decrease fS more than fN, increasing the relative 
number of projects implemented through the less efficient old technology and thus 
reducing firm productivity. Finally, if credit constraints for both technologies were 
reduced proportionately, some projects would be implemented adopting the new 
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technology while others would be implemented adopting the old technology with 
ambiguous effects on firm productivity. 
To summarize, our theoretical framework implies that, if BNDES loans relaxed 
the credit constraints faced by Brazilian firms, this would map into more projects being 
implemented. However, the implementation of more projects would eventually lead to 
higher firm productivity only if projects were implemented mainly using new 
technologies rather than old ones. 
3. Overview of BNDES schemes
 BNDES provides a wide range of financial tools to support Brazilian 
manufacturing firms: FINEM, Automatic BNDES, FINAME, Leasing FINAME, 
International Competition FINAME (BNDES-Exim) and Subscription of Securities. 
FINEM (“Financing and Endeavours”) is a direct or indirect support scheme for 
projects with financial needs over R$10 million (equivalent to US$ 5.7 million). 
Projects with financial needs below this threshold are instead supported solely indirectly 
through retailing banks under the Automatic BNDES scheme. Both schemes 
contemplate several categories of expenses covering the creation of new plants, the 
enlargement of existing ones, the restructuring and the modernization of processes, 
innovation, and technological development.3 
Through the FINAME (“Machines and Equipment”) and the Leasing FINAME 
schemes, BNDES supports the acquisition of new domestically produced machines and 
equipment either buying them (FINAME) or leasing them (Leasing FINAME). Finally, 
the aim of BNDES-Exim is to provide financial support for exports while the aim of 
Subscription of Securities is to facilitate changes in firm ownership. 
Our focus is on FINEM and Automatic BNDES as they are more focused on 
supporting the discovery and the implementation of promising projects. Differently, 
FINAME and Leasing FINAME do not contemplate investments in innovation and 
technological development.4 Nonetheless, it is necessary to account for them in order to 
isolate the role of FINEM and Automatic BNDES. BNDES-Exim and Subscription of 
Securities have, instead, rather different objectives.5 FINEM and Automatic BNDES are 
therefore loans that have stronger potential to directly affect firms’ productivity since 
their expansion may be guided by improvements in production and/or creation of new 
and/or more sophisticated goods.6 
In order to receive any of these two loans, either FINEM or Automatic BNDES, 
firms need to send a supporting application form with some brief information of their 
projects to a retailing bank or BNDES itself. The banks evaluate whether their projects 
are in line with the purpose of the mentioned loans. After getting their application 
approved, firms have to send complete and detailed project plans to be evaluated by the 
financial institutions. These project plans are evaluated in terms of whether they are 
economically viable, what collateral can be used to guarantee the loan, and so forth.  
If successful, the evaluation process culminates in a formal contract proposal 
where the terms and conditions of the loan are established, including amount, period, 
and interest rate. After negotiations have finished, the loan contract is signed. It is 
3 A complete list is available at http://www.bndes.gov.br. 
4 Their impact on firms’ productivity is investigated by Ribeiro and De Negri (2009) 
5 Although changes of ownership might affect firms’ performance, we are interested in how productivity 
might be affected by the implementation of projects. Additionally, all firms being supported by this 
scheme are discarded. 
6Regarding their importance, those two loans are quite representative in BNDES budget as they were on 
average 46% of the total disbursements from 2000 to 2009. 
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important to note two crucial points here. First, there is a limit for BNDES participation 
in any project. This varies over time but is generally around 80%. A project is thus 
never fully financed by BNDES. Second, firms receive their loan in instalments 
according to the development of the project and following a schedule decided during 
negotiation.  
In particular, firms receive the first instalment when the loan is approved and the 
remaining ones only after an evaluation of the project’s progress. Before the second 
instalment, the firm should prove whether the money of the first disbursement was 
invested as dictated by the project plan. Any violation of the loan terms leads to a 
further investigation and instalments are interrupted until justifications are given. If no 
problems emerge, instalments continue until the end of the project. Since these are long-
term projects, the period between contract signing and the end of instalments takes on 
average 5 years. Generally, only after all instalments have been paid, firms start to 
amortize their loans. 
4. Treatment and control groups
Do FINEM and Automatic BNDES loans help relax credit constraints that 
hamper the competitiveness of Brazilian firms? Answering this question requires, first 
of all, identifying the group of granted (‘treated’) firms for which enough information is 
available. Then, it is crucial to define a ‘valid’ counterfactual highlighting what would 
have happened to the granted firms had they not be supported by BNDES. Compared to 
the counterfactual, one has to establish whether firms granted BNDES loans were 
indeed credit constrained, and then check whether their performance actually changed 
after receiving the BNDES loans. Checking that they have implemented their projects 
is, instead, redundant given that, as already discussed, BNDES funds are transferred to 
firms in instalments and, except for the first one, these are made conditional on firms 
having successfully followed the agreed implementation plan. 
The analysis relies on micro-data drawn from a variety of sources already used 
by the papers described by Coelho and Sousa (2010). In particular, our dataset combines 
information from: the Annual Industrial Research (Pesquisa Industrial Anual – [PIA]) 
of the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia 
e Estatística – [IBGE])7; the Annual Social Information Report (Relação Anual de 
Informações Sociais – [RAIS]) of the Ministry of Labour; the Foreign Trade Secretary 
(Secretaria de Comércio Exterior – [SECEX]) of the Ministry of  Industrial 
Development and Foreign Trade; the Foreign Capital Census and the Central Bank 
Register of Brazilian Capital Abroad of the Brazilian Central Bank; BNDES itself.8 
4.1 Treated groups 
We select out group of ‘treated’ firms as follows. First, we use BNDES data to 
identify granted firms from 1995 to 2007.9 During this period, 9,828 firms were 
‘treated’ in that they received at least once one of the two targeted BNDES financial 
schemes (FINEM and/or Automatic BNDES schemes). These firms represent nearly 4% 
of all manufacturing firms in Brazil.10 Second, it is unfortunately impossible to use all 
7 This is our main data source, since it contains the majority of the variables useful for this analysis, 
including those needed to measure firm productivity. 
8 The construction of the dataset has followed procedures that guarantee the confidentiality of information 
so that individual data cannot be related to any specific firm. 
9 Data on 1995 are used only to exclude any firm that received ‘financial treatment’ in that particular year. 
Data on 2007 are used for choosing a counterfactual group, as described in a later stage in this paper. 
10 More precisely, there were 274,515 active firms in the Brazilian manufacturing sector in 2007 (source 
PIA/IBGE). 
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these manufacturers as some of them are not available from PIA, especially small firms. 
The reason is that PIA covers only around 30,000 firms with more than 30 employees. 
These firms represent only 11% of all manufacturers but around 2/3 of overall 
manufacturing employment.11 Hence, the fact that we have to focus only on PIA firms 
reduces the number of firms granted Automatic BNDES in our sample by half. Third, 
the size of the ‘treated’ group is further reduced because we want to evaluate only the 
performance of manufacturing firms granted loans to implement projects in the 
manufacturing sector. BNDES records, however, concern all manufacturing projects. 
They thus report also manufacturing projects by non-manufacturing firms (e.g., those of 
large food retailers investing in the development of their own brands) and do not cover 
non-manufacturing projects of manufacturing firms (e.g., those implemented in 
agriculture). Fourth, some firms appear or disappear from records due to mergers. For 
example, if Firm A received a loan in 1997 and in 2000 merged with Firm B creating a 
new Firm C, the initial loan should be registered for firm C. As the past records of Firm 
C are impossible to reconstruct, we drop all information on loans projects granted to 
firms like A and B.12 Finally, there is a time lag of generally two to three years before a 
firm enters the Census part of PIA.13 Hence, some granted firms with more than 30 
employees are not recorded by PIA at the moment they receive BNDES loans. 
Further issues potentially affect the size our ‘treated’ group. Some firms are 
exposed to other government interventions apart from BNDES loans. Since BNDES is 
the largest financial institution in Brazil offering loans for long-term projects, we imply 
assume that its loans are the main type of policy tools affecting firms’ productivity. In 
addition, there may be a time lag for any impact to be detected, since outcomes do not 
necessarily appear immediately after the loan has been granted. As some projects last at 
least five years, we need a period beyond the five-year horizon to assess their impacts. 
Given the time spanned by our dataset (1996 to 2006), that is clearly not feasible for 
loans granted from 1999 onwards. On the other hand, as we will discuss later, to 
construct the ‘control’ group for firms treated in a certain year, one needs at least two 
years before treatment. Hence, the impact of BNDES schemes can be scrutinized only 
for firms granted Automatic BNDES and FINEM loans in 1998. Excluding all firms 
treated before 1998 leaves us with 227 firms. Among these, 86 firms are not present in 
PIA dataset for the whole period investigated.14 In the end, the ‘treated’ group consists 
thus of 141 firms. 
Lastly, it may be useful to distinguish among three ‘treated’ groups. Group I 
comprises all our 141 firms. To see whether there is any differential impacts between 
FINEM and Automatic BNDES, Group II consists only of firms receiving Automatic 
BNDES. To investigate the effects of repeated treatment, Group III considers only firms 
11 Firms with less than 30 employees are also considered in this survey, but they are selected randomly for 
the survey each year. Since their sample varies annually, and is thus impossible to follow, we have 
decided to discard them. 
12 All firms that have received financial support through Subscription of Securities are deleted from our 
sample. 
13 IBGE receives information of firms’ size (number of employees) for a particular year only at the end of 
the following year. 
14 There are three possible explanations for why a firm leaves the PIA dataset: first, it goes bankrupt; 
second, its employment level falls short of the threshold of 30 employees; third, the main part of its 
revenue does not come anymore from manufacturing. 
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Description Number of Firms
Group I Firms granted for the 1st time in 1998 141
Group II Firms granted only Automatic BNDES 112
Group III Firms granted only in1998 75
Table 1 – Treated Groups
4.2. Control groups 
How can we build a ‘valid’ counterfactual for the selected groups of ‘treated’ 
firms? Short of natural experiments or randomized control trials, the answer is not 
straightforward and we try various alternatives which we present in increasing order of 
sophistication.  
4.2.1. Unobservable characteristics 
As a first alternative we use our judgement to identify ‘control’ groups that are 
likely to share similar unobservable characteristics with the ‘treated’ ones. The first 
‘control’ Group A consists of all 21,380 Brazilian firms (above 30 employees) that do 
not receive any BNDES loans during the period of analysis. Firms, however, are not 
randomly selected by BNDES. Ideally one would like to compare granted to non-
granted, yet eligible, firms. As granted firms are among those interested in making 
investments, Group B consists of all non-granted firms that during the investigated 
period have invested and survived. There are 6,344 such firms. Vice versa, as granted 
firms are assumed to be credit constrained, another control group should include non-
granted firms that might have invested if they have had access to credit. Since our 
treated group comprehends firms granted loans in 1998, control Group C comprises 
firms that have not invested before 1998, yet they have invested afterwards. There are 
1,124 such firms. Lastly, Group D is composed by firms that have received BNDES 
loans but not during the investigated period as also these firms may be similar to those 
granted. Given that the information we use to test whether BNDES financial support has 
any impact begins in 1996 and ends in 2006, we place in Group D all firms granted in 
2007 for the first time. It is important to mention that firms from Groups C and D are 
also contained in Groups A and B, and all firms from Group B also belong to Group A.  
Table 2 gives a summary of the main characteristics of treated and non-treated firms 
before BNDES intervention.16 First, credit constraints seem indeed to be stricter for 
‘treated’ than ‘non-treated’ firms: whereas cash flow over capital is lower for the former 
than the latter, the reverse holds for the investment rate (investment over capital). While 
this is consistent with ‘treated’ firms facing stricter constraints, it may also be due to the 
fact that granted firms are more present in riskier sectors, as evidenced by the OECD 
technological classification.  
15 We have also investigated different treated groups (such as firms financed through Automatic BNDES 
only in 1998 or all firms financed in 1998 regardless of their survival rate), but results were similar to 
those presented for the chosen three treated groups. 
16Table A.2 presents descriptive statistics for all variables in Appendix II. Description and sources are 
shown at Table A.1 in Appendix I. 
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Group A Group B Group C Group D Group I Group II Group III
All Firms over 
30 employees










 All only in 
1998
Labour Productivity 26.6 26.8 12,5 27 35.5 29.7 31.8
Labour Productivity Grow th 30.30% 26.00% 22.50% 14.30% 31.70% 27.60% 34.60%
TFP Levinhson-Petrin 100 99.6 94.8 99.1 102.6 101.9 101.7
TFP Grow th -3.20% -1.10% -4.20% -2.90% 0.50% -1.60% 0.00%
Number of Employees 175 196 89 255 620 332 468
Investment / Capital 3.70% 4.00% 0.00% 4.20% 6.60% 6.90% 5.50%
Cash Flow  / Capital 12.30% 16.70% 12.20% 19.00% 10.50% 10.40% 11.20%
Export Status 32.2% 40.0% 23.1% 38.3% 58.9% 54.5% 49.3%
Export Share of Exporters 15.2% 15.3% 11.6% 20.1% 11.0% 10.3% 10.3%
Export Share All 4.90% 6.10% 2.68% 7.70% 6.50% 5.60% 5.10%
OCDE Classif ication
High & Medium-High Tech 22% 26% 17% 18% 32% 32% 35%
Low  & Medium-Low  Tech 78% 74%  83% 82% 68% 68% 65%
Number of Firms 21,380 6,344 1,124 128 141 112 75
* All values from 1997
Table 2: Average of Some Variables from Financed Firms in 1998 and Non Financed Firms One Year Before Treatment
Variables *
Non Treated Firms Treated Firms
Turning to performance, on average treated firms are larger and tend to exhibit 
higher productivity. This is so in terms of both total factor productivity (TFP) and 
labour productivity (value added per worker), though the difference is more pronounced 
for the latter.17 While the labour productivity of firms granted for the first time in 1998 
(Group I) is more than 30% higher than that of non-granted firms that survived and 
invested (Group B), the TFP of the former is only 3% higher than that of the latter. 
Compared to the period before treatment, both measures of productivity grow faster for 
treated than non-treated firms. 
4.2.2. Observable characteristics 
So far we have proposed ‘control’ groups based on their likely similarity with 
the ‘treated’ ones with respect to unobservable characteristics, yet differences persist as 
shown in the previous section. Alternatively, we can try to minimize the differences 
between ‘treated’ and ‘control’ groups in terms of observable characteristics. In so 
doing we use one-to-one Propensity Score Matching (PSM).18 This method creates a 
counterfactual group by pairing each granted firm with a similar non-granted one. 
Treated firms that cannot be paired with any non-granted firm are discarded. 
In our case matching is based on pre-treatment observable characteristics that 
can be considered as relevant for firms to be eligible for support. In principle, these 
characteristics should include both dynamic performance indicators (e.g. revenue 
growth) and static performance indicators (e.g. size) as well as financial information 
(e.g. availability of collateral).19 To pin down the subset of characteristics that are 
indeed relevant, we use a Probit model in which the outcome is the ex-ante probability 
of receiving financial support from BNDES. We then pair granted and non-granted 
firms with similar ex-ante probability of being funded. We start looking for matches at 
the seventh decimal digit of probability. For unmatched firms we gradually relax the 
17 Appendix VI describes the estimation procedures of TFP à la Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). 
18 See Arnold and Javornik (2005) who use PSM to evaluate the impact of foreign investment on firm 
productivity in Indonesia. 
19 More details of each variable are available in Appendix III. 
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requirement until the second decimal digit.20 Granted firms that at that point cannot find 
a non-granted match are dropped.21 
Considering only non-granted firms that invest and survive during our period of 
analysis (6,344 firms), we find three different ‘control’ groups depending on each 
‘treated’ group. A summary of how many firms are matched is shown in Table 3. More 
than 80% of treated firms find their non-treated ‘twin’. 
Group I Group II Group III
Treated Matched 118 99 65
Treated Not Matched 23 13 10
Percentage Matched 84% 88% 87%
Table 3: Number of Matched Firms
Table 4 illustrates the extent to which matched pairs are similar in terms of the 
observable characteristics. It reports averages for these characteristics as well as the t-
statistics and p-values for the test of mean difference between matched pairs.22 
Not Matched Matched Matched Not Matched t Value P-value
Capital Stock 19 53 66 179 -0.55 58.0%
Number of Employees 192 420 526 1,103 -1.03 30.2%
Solvency 3.0% 2.5% 2.7% 3.2% -0.44 66.0%
Profit 6.7% 6.2% 6.4% 2.0% -0.20 84.3%
Profit Growth 49% 82% 38% 125% 1.78 7.8%
Employment Growth 4% 5% 8% 14% -0.71 47.6%
Revenue Growth 21% 21% 20% 7% 0.18 85.7%
Market Share 0.10% 0.10% 0.20% 0.90% -1.91 5.8%
Multinational Status 8% 11% 16% 9% -1.14 25.6%
Rich 87% 87% 89% 83% -0.40 68.9%
Labour Productivity 26.8 30.3 35.1 37.6 -1.21 22.7%
TFP Productivity 99.6 100.0 103.0 100.6 -1.67 9.6%
Investment 2.3 5.6 11.9 33.5 -1.41 16.0%
Cash Flow / Capital 16.8% 10.6% 10.4% 11.4% 0.14 88.8%
Investment / Capital 4.0% 4.3% 6.8% 6.0% -3.23 0.2%
Number of Firms 6226 118 118 23
Table 4: Comparing All Firms Granted in 1998 after Matching with Non Granted
Non-Treated Treated Testing Matched Firms
Generally, it is possible to observe that treated and non-treated firms are much 
more alike in Table 4 than in Table 2. At the 5% level of significance, nearly all 
averages do not exhibit any statistically difference. Most notably, although some 
observable characteristics are not considered in our Probit model since they are not 
eligibility criteria for BNDES support, matched firms are similar even with respect to 
those characteristics. An important example is productivity: matched firms exhibit 
similar productivity levels before treatment even though productivity is not used to 
20 If no matches are found until second decimal digit, the treated firm is considered “not matched”. 
21 More information on PSM results are presented in Appendix III. 
22It is important to notice that for performing the Probit model, all continuous variables are in logs, where 
averages reported in Table 5 as well as test of means are in levels. Additionally, for parsimony, we are 
presenting only results related to Group 1. Results using the other three groups are presented in the 
Appendix III. 
13 
match them.23 For these reasons, we consider the control group derived from PSM the 
most reliable counterfactual. 
Now that we have identified the ‘treatment’ and ‘control’ groups we can check 
first whether granted firms are indeed credit constrained before receiving BNDES 
support, and then whether their performance improves after receiving BNDES support. 
5. Were granted firms credit constrained before ‘treatment’?
Credit constraints can be investigated in the wake of Fazzari, Hubbard and 
Peterson (1988) and recent related works by Carpenter and Guariglia (2008), Guariglia 
(2008) and Guariglia, Liu and Song (2011). These works measure credit constraints by 
looking at the correlation between firms’ investment and cash flows. The idea we 
already used to comment on Table 2 is that, when firms are credit constrained, 
investment has to rely on own liquidity leading to a positive correlation between 
investment and cash flow.24 This idea can be implemented through the following 
regression: 
Invit/Kit-1 = β(CashFlowit/Kit-1) + α(CashFlowit/Kit-1)*BNDESi + γXit + εit (7) 
where i identifies the firm and t denotes time, Invit is the level of investment, Kit-1 is the 
capital stock, CashFlowit is the amount of cash flow generated, BNDESi is a dummy for 
‘treated’ firms granted a loan in 1998 (treated Group I), Xit is a set of controls and εit is 
the error term. As the capital stock is lagged in time, this specification requires two-
period information and, as our treated group comprehends 1998 granted firms, we are 
restricted to use information from 1996 and 1997. We are thus able to estimate this 
specification only with OLS in the cross section. In order to eliminate as much as 
possible firms’ specific characteristics, we introduce different sets of dummies, 
including OCDE technological classification, size, region and multinational status, as 
well as current and lagged sales over capital. For investment opportunities, we have 
followed the literature by including sectoral value added variation and investment. The 
parameter of interest is α. A significant positive estimate would mean that, before 
receiving BNDES support in 1998, granted firms faced indeed stricter credit constraints 
than non-granted firms. 
 Table 5 reports the estimation results for equation (7). Columns correspond to 
the different counterfactuals. Since the coefficient of cash flow interacted with the 
BNDES dummy is positive and significant in all entries, the table shows that granted 
firms are indeed more credit constrained than most control groups before being awarded 
BNDES financial support. These findings are confirmed also in the case of ‘treated’ 
Groups II and III, except for the control group created through propensity score 
matching in which case paired non-granted firms do not seem to present softer credit 
constraints than granted firms.25 
23 Not only previous productivity measures (either labour or TFP) are not considered as eligible criteria 
when BNDES analyses a project, but also previous investment level and cash flow over capital. All those 
measures are not included in our Probit model used to match treated and non-treated firms. 
24 See also Aldrighi and Bisinha (2010), Ambrozio, Faleiros, Sant’Anna and Sousa (2013), and Terra 
(2003) for other papers investigating credit restriction using Brazilian firm-level data. 
25 Results for Groups II and III are available in Appendix IV. 
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Dependent Variable: Invest / K All Firms Invested Firms No Investment before 1998 Granted 2007 Paired Firms w ith Group I
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Cash Flow  / K 0.000816** 0.000436 0.00548* -0.00704 0.0508
(0.000410) (0.00110) (0.00292) (0.0159) (0.0394)
BNDES * Cash Flow  / K 0.131*** 0.128*** 0.268*** 0.128*** 0.120**
(0.0302) (0.0300) (0.0160) (0.0419) (0.0532)
Sales / K -0.000290*** -0.000413*** -0.00555*** -0.00124 -0.0247***
(3.45e-05) (0.000158) (0.00110) (0.00355) (0.00721)
Sales / K lagged in time 0.000352*** 0.000290*** 0.00683*** 0.000518*** 0.0168***
(1.96e-05) (2.44e-05) (0.000992) (0.000188) (0.00406)
Sector Investment 0.0903*** 0.105*** 0.0119 0.109*** 0.0253
(0.00397) (0.00628) (0.00879) (0.0391) (0.0454)
Sector Value Added Var. -0.0564*** -0.0704*** -0.0292** -0.0771 0.0103
(0.00587) (0.00929) (0.0127) (0.0594) (0.0635)
OCDE Tech. Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Multinational Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Size Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 18,104 6,485 1,246 271 216
R-squared 0.111 0.132 0.339 0.215 0.181
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1
Table 5: Credit Restriction
6. Do granted firms improve their performance after ‘treatment’?
After checking that, before accessing BNDES funds, granted firms faced more 
severe credit constraints than non-granted ones, we can now investigate whether 
BNDES support affected their subsequent performance. We do this through a 
difference-in-differences (DID) approach that allows us to eliminate any residual time-
invariant unobservable characteristic that is different between ‘treated’ and ‘non-





ttiit XPOSTBNDESDBNDESy    )(  (8) 
where ity  is a productivity measure, BNDESi is a dummy variable indicating granted 
firms in 1998, Dt is a year dummy, POSTt  is a set of dummies for each year after the 
firm receives the loan, and Xit is the vector of control variables. The parameter of 
interest is δt, whose estimated value measures the impact of BNDES support on firm 
productivity over time. Note that the estimation of (8) allows us to assess not only 
whether BNDES support affects firm productivity but also when its impact eventually 
materializes. 
Table 6 present the estimation results using Group 1. Control groups are 
presented in increasing order of refinement: all existent firms; firms that invested and 
survived; firms that did not make any investments before 1998; firms that received their 
first BNDES support in 2007; pair firms through propensity scored matching.26 
Columns of each counterfactual group are divided into two types of productivity 
measures: labour productivity and total factor productivity (TFP) estimated following 
the procedure by Levinhson and Petrin (2003).27 
26 It is important to mention that all control groups, apart from “All Firms”, consider only firms that 
survived during the whole period investigated. For instance, firms that did not invest until 1997 survived 
from 1996 to 2006. 
27 Results with all controls as well as for treated groups II and III are available in Appendix V. Taking 
into consideration only Automatic BNDES schemes or firms financed only once in 1998 gives similar 
results. In other words, using different ‘treated’ groups leads to similar conclusions. 
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Control Group
Dependent Variable Labor TFP Labor TFP Labor TFP Labor TFP Labor TFP
Effect in 1998 0.130** -0.00728 0.0943* 0.0162 0.192*** 0.0180 0.180 0.0211 0.103 0.0176
(0.0577) (0.0466) (0.0565) (0.0451) (0.0711) (0.0477) (0.156) (0.0649) (0.102) (0.0605)
Effect in 1999 0.150*** -0.0589 0.109** -0.0210 0.183*** -0.0516 0.0303 -0.0227 0.0940 -0.0414
(0.0549) (0.0449) (0.0533) (0.0431) (0.0669) (0.0467) (0.123) (0.0609) (0.0983) (0.0587)
Effect in 2000 0.181*** -0.0764 0.130** -0.0185 0.216*** -0.0564 0.0742 -0.0383 0.194 -0.0889
(0.0562) (0.0466) (0.0550) (0.0442) (0.0698) (0.0475) (0.158) (0.0613) (0.118) (0.0595)
Effect in 2001 0.163*** -0.0839* 0.128** -0.0276 0.194*** -0.0599 0.281 0.00854 0.195* -0.0620
(0.0589) (0.0433) (0.0574) (0.0415) (0.0687) (0.0450) (0.199) (0.0587) (0.119) (0.0599)
Effect in 2002 0.169*** -0.0512 0.153*** 0.0224 0.244*** -0.0100 0.182 0.0121 0.0724 0.00629
(0.0567) (0.0455) (0.0550) (0.0442) (0.0696) (0.0471) (0.130) (0.0624) (0.0736) (0.0609)
Effect in 2003 0.126** -0.0978** 0.123** -0.0284 0.185*** -0.0823* -0.0456 -0.0402 0.104 -0.0610
(0.0529) (0.0462) (0.0511) (0.0450) (0.0642) (0.0484) (0.106) (0.0606) (0.0743) (0.0622)
Effect in 2004 0.0993* -0.106** 0.113** -0.0184 0.115* -0.0840* -0.0556 -0.0598 0.0918 -0.0664
(0.0583) (0.0442) (0.0561) (0.0429) (0.0668) (0.0465) (0.108) (0.0620) (0.0760) (0.0606)
Effect in 2005 0.0573 -0.134*** 0.0875 -0.0462 0.0919 -0.111** -0.0822 -0.0574 0.0717 -0.104*
(0.0587) (0.0434) (0.0563) (0.0417) (0.0660) (0.0456) (0.108) (0.0612) (0.0763) (0.0628)
Effect in 2006 0.0122 -0.193*** 0.0600 -0.0636 0.0719 -0.123*** -0.104 -0.115* 0.0789 -0.0791
(0.0581) (0.0457) (0.0563) (0.0439) (0.0655) (0.0472) (0.107) (0.0642) (0.0744) (0.0606)
Multiple Treatments 0.00255 0.00167 0.00657 -0.0138* 0.00347 -0.0197*** 0.0136 -0.00822 0.0120 -0.0262***
(0.00802) (0.00723) (0.00782) (0.00712) (0.00914) (0.00759) (0.00915) (0.00752) (0.0102) (0.00816)
Domestic Capital 0.0194*** -0.0147*** -0.0155 -0.144*** -0.0217
(0.00450) (0.00568) (0.0185) (0.0394) (0.0301)
Imported Capital 0.0181** 0.0143 0.0471** 0.0770** 0.0529**
(0.00904) (0.00900) (0.0231) (0.0319) (0.0225)
Observations 203.418 192,970 78,137 76,878 12,220 11,811 2.698 2,674 2.336 2,317
R-squared 0.693 0.336 0.707 0.445 0.669 0.405 0.694 0.446 0.779 0.495
Robust standard errors in parenthese
* significantat 5%; ** significantat 1%
No Invest. before 98
Table 6: Results of Difference-in-Differences (More  than Once)
All Firms Invested BNDES 2007 Paired
As the TFP measure accounts for differences in capital stock among firms, the 
corresponding regressions do not feature investment in either domestic capital or 
imported capital as a covariate.28 These are, instead, included in the case of labour 
productivity. Interestingly, investment in imported capital and labour productivity are 
positively correlated while no clear cut correlation appears in the case of domestic 
capital. This may suggest that imported capital goods are technologically more 
advanced. 
As for our parameter of interest, in the case of labour productivity results are 
mixed depending on control groups. In our less refined control groups (Groups A, B and 
C), we find a positive impact of BNDES support on labour productivity until 2004 and 
no effect afterwards, suggesting that it improves the relative performance of granted 
firms for seven years. However, this does not happen when we consider the remaining 
more refined control groups (Groups D and E). Compared to these groups, ‘treated’ 
firms do not perform any different. On the other hand, results are not mixed in the case 
of TFP, in which no effect of BNDES support is detected in the first years after ‘treated’ 
firms are granted whatever compassion group is considered. From 2003, BNDES 
financial support impacts negatively granted firms when compared to those in control 
Groups A and C. However, this does not happen for the other three control groups 
28 We have included them but results remained qualitatively similar. 
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(Group B, D and E). Overall, we find little ground to conclude that BNDES support has 
any robust effect on granted firms’ productivity in our sample.29 
7. Concluding remarks
Do FINEM and Automatic BNDES loans help relax credit constraints that 
hamper the competitiveness of Brazilian firms? We have addressed this question by 
comparing granted and non-granted firms. It has been crucial to identify a ‘valid’ 
counterfactual highlighting what would have happened to the granted firms had they not 
been supported by BNDES. Compared to the counterfactual, we have checked whether 
firms granted BNDES loans were indeed credit constrained, and then whether their 
performance actually changed after receiving BNDES loans.  
Overall, granted firms appear to have been more credit constrained than 
comparable non-granted firms before receiving BNDES support. Moreover, it seems 
that such support has allowed the selected sample of granted firms to achieve the same 
level of performance as similar firms that were not credit constrained, but not to 
outperform them.  
While this is already some achievement, a positive differential impact on the 
performance of granted firms could be achieved through a more pro-active role of 
BNDES in helping these firms select their projects. We have used a simple theoretical 
framework to show that, if some projects are implemented through new technologies 
and others through old ones, the net effect on firm productivity might be null. If 
BNDES wanted to further improve the competitiveness of Brazilian manufacturers, 
more emphasis should be given to projects using new technologies. As most of the 
BNDES loans are selected by the retailing banking system, targeting innovative 
technologies may require rethinking the instructions given by BNDES to banks.  
29 Our findings are not an isolated case in the literature. For example, Criscuolo et al (2007) investigated 
the effect on industrial policy in the UK. Their results show no significant impact on firms’ productivity, 
even though there are effects on employment and investment. Similar outcomes are also found by 
Ottaviano and Sousa (2008) and Sousa (2013) who investigating the same BNDES schemes through 
different empirical strategies. 
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Appendix I: List of Variables 
Variables Variable Description Source
M ultinationals Number of M ultinationals BACEN
% M ultinationals Share of M ultinationals BACEN
Labour Productivity Value Added / Number of Employees PIA
Value Added Value Added PIA
Number of Employees Number of Employees PIA
Average Wage Total Wages / Number of Employees PIA
Investment Total Investment PIA
Capital Stock Capital Stock calculated by Perpetual Inventory (using Energy Consumption) PIA
Total Revenue Total Revenue (including Financial Revenue, for example) PIA
Selling Revenue Net Selling Revenues (only Goods) PIA
M arket Share M arket Share by Net Selling Revenues PIA
Total Production Value Value o f Total Production (before taxes) PIA
Energy Consumption Expenditure in Electricity and Fuel Expenditure PIA
Profitability Net Pro fits / Total Revenue PIA
Net Profit Net Pro fits PIA
Cash Flow Net Pro fits plus Depreciation & Amortizations PIA
Financial Status Financial Expenditure / Total Costs PIA
Solvency Financial Expenditure / Net Selling Revenue PIA
Financial Expenditures Financial Expenditure PIA
Total Cost Total Cost PIA
Efficiency Production Cost / Total Production Value PIA
Tax 1 Production Taxes / Selling Gross Revenue PIA
Tax 2 All Taxes (Production + Land) / Selling Gross Revenue PIA
Employees Growth Annual Growth of Total Number of Employees PIA
Revenue Growth Annual Growth of Net Selling Revenue PIA
Productivity Growth Annual Growth of Productivity PIA
Profit Growth Annual Growth of Profits PIA
Number Firms Profitable Number of Firms which have earn Profits PIA
Share of Profitable Share of Profitable Firms PIA
Rich Region Number of Firms in Rich Regions PIA
% Rich Region Share of Firms in Rich Regions PIA
Small Size Number of Firms which Number of Employees is less than 100 PIA
M edium Size Number of Firms which Number of Employees is greater than 100 and less than 500 PIA
Large Size Number of Firms which Number of Employees is greater than 500 PIA
Share of Small Share of Small Firms ( < 100) PIA
Share of M edium Share of M edium Firms ( > 100 e < 500) PIA
Share of Large Share of Large Firms ( > 500) PIA
OCDE Classification High, M edium-High, M edium-Low and Low Technology PIA & OCDE
Export Coefficient Total Exports / Total Production Value PIA & SECEX
Import Coefficient Total Imports / Total Production Value PIA & SECEX
Input Imports Coef Intermediates Goods Imports / M anufacturing Operation Cost PIA & SECEX
Capital Imports Coef Capital Goods Imports / Investments PIA & SECEX
Age Number of Years o f Firm's existence RAIS
Workers' Schooling Number of Years Spent on Education RAIS
Skill Worker % Share of Workers with at least Undergraduate Level Completed RAIS
Capital Imports Capital Goods Imports SECEX
Input Imports Intermediates Goods Imports SECEX
Total Exports Total Volume of Exports FOB SECEX
Export Status Percentage of Firms which have exported during 1996 to  2006 SECEX
Total Imports Total Volume of Imports FOB SECEX
Table A.1: Description of Variables
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Appendix II: Descriptive Statistics 
All Firms over 
30 employees
Survived and 




First  Treated in 
2007
All First Time in 
1998
Automat ic 
BNDES First  
Time in 1998
All only in 1998
Unit
21,380 6,344 1124 128 141 112 75
20.1 22.6 21 22.1 26.6 25 24.4 Years
26.6 26.8 12.5 27 35.5 29.7 31.8 R$ thousand /  worker
30.3% 26.0% 22.5% 14.3% 31.7% 27.6% 34.6% %
100 99.6 94.8 99.1 102.6 101.9 101.7 TFP All Firms = 100
-3.2% -1.1% -4.2% -2.9% 0.5% -1.6% 0.0% %
3.7% 4.0% 0.0% 4.2% 6.6% 6.9% 5.5% %
12.3% 16.7% 12.2% 19.0% 10.5% 10.4% 11.2% %
45% 58% 40% 63% %
6.84 7.4 1.22 12.07 28.9 9.99 24.95 R$ millions
175 196 89 255 620 332 468 Number
22 23.3 14.4 21.4 31.5 26.9 24.8 R$ thousand /  worker
6.7 6.7 6.1 6.5 7.1 7 6.9 Years
5.80% 6.80% 3.62% 5.70% 9.20% 8.10% 9.20% %
1.17 0.86 0 1.24 5.45 1.58 4.79 R$ millions
31.58 19.61 3.97 34.86 84.45 29.02 53.87 R$ millions
32.35 18.15 3.29 32.19 113.44 33.22 81.44 R$ millions
17.01 16.56 3.0 25.21 80.71 22.66 82.02 R$ millions
15.71 15.41 2.91 21.65 72.91 21.22 73.5 R$ millions
0.09% 0.11% 0.02% 0.12% 0.33% 0.11% 0.31% %
14.96 14.9 2.82 21.6 68.49 20.86 64.88 R$ millions
0.32 0.3 0.02 0.3 3.49 0.28 5.64 R$ billions
1.18 1.2 0.09 1.54 3.97 0.63 4.2 R$ billions
1 0.99 0.23 1.23 5.99 0.93 2.54 R$ millions
5.85% 6.69% 6.1% 7.92% 5.68% 5.89% 6.38% %
1 1.11 0.41 2 4.58 1.34 5.23 R$ millions
3.90% 3.60% 2.79% 3.20% 4.70% 4.50% 5.00% %
3.90% 3.00% 2.77% 2.20% 2.80% 2.80% 3.10% %
3.60% 2.80% 1.90% 2.50% 2.60% 2.80% %
0.62 0.46 0.39 0.47 2.05 0.59 2.28 R$ millions
18.2 16.6 4.2 24.4 79.3 22.1 80.2 R$ millions
52% 50% 52% 53% 52% 52% 51% %
17% 16% 15% 16% 15% 15% 15% %
17% 16% 16% 17% 15% 15% 15% %
1.87 1.75 0.17 4.47 9.27 1.13 6.45 R$ millions
1.75 1.78 0.14 2.14 8.67 1.2 11.68 R$ millions
4.90% 6.10% 2.68% 7.70% 6.50% 5.60% 5.10% %
4.20% 4.60% 2.22% 5.30% 5.60% 4.60% 4.50% %
4% 5% 2% 7% 6% 5% 5% %
5% 6% 0% 8% 9% 9% 5% %
0.10% 4.30% 3.39% 1.80% 8.80% 10.30% 6.20% %
22.10% 20.60% 15.27% 16.90% 17.50% 13.70% 13.80% %
45.80% 50.10% 45.80% 15.30% 44.40% 50.30% 65.10% %
4,344 1,740 240 36 40 34 24 Number
20.30% 27.40% 21.35% 28.10% 28.40% 30.40% 32.00% %
1,089 509 8 7 21 13 8 Number
5.09% 8.02% 0.71% 5.47% 14.89% 11.61% 10.67% %
18,165 5,505 914 119 124 97 61 Number
85% 87% 81% 93% 88% 87% 81% %
14,416 3,584 882 69 43 42 31 Number
5,686 2,304 231 45 57 48 27 Number
1,278 456 11 14 41 22 17 Number
67% 56% 78% 54% 30% 38% 41% %
27% 36% 21% 35% 40% 43% 36% %
6% 7% 1% 11% 29% 20% 23% %
4,732 1,648 193 23 45 36 26 Number
5,360 1,789 364 36 30 18 13 Number
11,288 2,907 567 69 66 58 36 Number
22% 26% 17% 18% 32% 32% 35% %
25% 28% 32% 28% 21% 16% 17% %
53% 46% 50% 54% 47% 52% 48% %
Non Treated Firms
Variables
Number of  Firms
Age
Labour Product ivity




Investment /  Capital
Cash Flow /  Capital
Export  Status


























Export  Coeff icient







Share of  Profitable
M ult inat ionals
OC D E C lassif icat ion
High & M edium-High Tech






Table A.2: Variables' Average from Financed Firms in 1998 and Non Financed Firms One Year Before Treatment (in 1997)
Treated Firms
Share Low Tech
Share High & M edium-High Tech
Share M edium-Low Tech
M edium-Low Tech
Share of  Small
Share of  M edium
Share of  Large
Low Tech
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Appendix III: Propensity score matching 
Probit Model Employees Revenues
Dependent Variable: BNDES Dummy (i) (ii)










Profit Growth 0.07 0.08
(0.04)* (0.04)*
Employees Growth 0.28 0.38
(0.16)* (0.16)**
Revenue Growth -0.10 -0.17
(0.14) (0.14)
Market Share 190.87 182.76
(87.14)** (87.58)*
Multinational Status -0.10 -0.17
(0.14) (0.14)
Rich Region 0.14 0.12
(0.13) (0.13)
Sector Dummies Yes Yes
Observations 5.55 5.55
Percent Concordant 76% 76.2%
Hosmer and Lemeshow Statistic 0.86 0.74
Table A.3: Probit Model Results
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Not Matched Matched Matched Not Matched t Value P-value
Capital Stock 18 26 30 20 -0.49 62.8%
Number of Employees 192 312 337 297 -0.36 72.1%
Solvency 3.0% 2.4% 2.6% 4.3% -0.39 69.8%
Profit 6.7% 6.1% 6.5% 1.00% -0.40 68.6%
Profit Growth 49% 87% 51% -23% 1.22 22.5%
Employment Growth 4% 4% 9% 19% -1.21 22.9%
Revenue Growth 21% 18% 16% 0% 0.51 61.0%
Market Share 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0% -1.43 15.3%
Multinational Status 8% 6% 13% 0% -1.69 9.2%
Rich 87% 85% 88% 77% -0.62 53.7%
Labour Productivity 26.7 25.2 31.7 14.1 -1.72 8.7%
TFP Productivity 99.6 100 102.7 93.5 -1.55 12.3%
Investment 0.8 1.4 1.6 1.6 -0.25 80.5%
Cash Flow / Capital 16.8% 10.8% 10.1% 12.4% 0.41 68.2%
Investment / Capital 4.0% 4.4% 7.0% 6.4% -2.94 0.3%
Number of Firms 6234 99 99 13
Table A.3.a: Comparing Granted Firms by Automatic BNDES after Matching with Non Granted
Non-Treated Treated Testing Matched Firms
Not Matched Matched Matched Not Matched t Value P-value
Capital Stock 20 27 35 17.7 -0.65 51.8%
Number of Employees 195 298 302 1.553 -0.05 95.8%
Solvency 3.0% 2.5% 3.1% 2.8% -0.62 53.7%
Profit 6.7% 6.8% 7.0% 2.4% -0.10 92.2%
Profit Growth 50% 54% 63% 117% -0.27 79.1%
Employment Growth 4% 3% 5% 18% -0.33 74.4%
Revenue Growth 21% 19% 15% 9% 0.81 41.9%
Market Share 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 1.6% -1.18 24.1%
Multinational Status 8% 6% 9% 20% -0.65 51.4%
Rich 87% 85% 83% 70% 0.24 81.3%
Labour Productivity 26.9 25.7 31.5 33.7 -1.12 26.7%
TFP Productivity 99.6 100.2 102.2 99.1 -1.36 17.5%
Investment 0.9 0.6 2.5 18.0 -1.78 7.8%
Cash Flow / Capital 16.7% 10.5% 10.3% 17% 0.08 93.6%
Investment / Capital 4.0% 5.9% 4.1% 14.4% 1.59 11.2%
Number of Firms 6279 65 65 10
Table A.3.b: Comparing Granted Firms only in 1998 after Matching with Non Granted
Non-Treated Treated Testing Matched Firms
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Appendix IV: Credit constraints for alternative treated groups 
Dependent Variable: Invest / K All Firms Invested Firms No Investment before 1998 Granted 2007 Paired Firms w ith Group II
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Cash Flow  / K 0.000814** 0.000430 0.00559* -0.00642 0.0664
(0.000411) (0.00110) (0.00291) (0.0167) (0.0426)
BNDES * Cash Flow  / K 0.135*** 0.126*** 0.274*** 0.114** 0.0728
(0.0349) (0.0346) (0.0174) (0.0485) (0.0646)
Sales / K -0.000290*** -0.000414*** -0.00541*** -0.00106 -0.0524***
(3.46e-05) (0.000159) (0.00112) (0.00404) (0.0113)
Sales / K lagged in time 0.000352*** 0.000290*** 0.00677*** 0.000501** 0.0299***
(1.96e-05) (2.44e-05) (0.000993) (0.000208) (0.00587)
Sector Investment 0.0901*** 0.104*** 0.00889 0.111** 0.0317
(0.00397) (0.00630) (0.00876) (0.0434) (0.0514)
Sector Value Added Var. -0.0562*** -0.0701*** -0.0247* -0.0799 -0.0101
(0.00588) (0.00932) (0.0127) (0.0655) (0.0723)
OCDE Tech. Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Multinational Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Size Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 18,075 6,456 1,217 242 180
R-squared 0.111 0.131 0.300 0.207 0.222
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1
Table A.4.a: Credit Restriction - Automatic BNDES
Dependent Variable: Invest / K All Firms Invested Firms No Investment before 1998 Granted 2007 Paired Firms w ith Group III
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Cash Flow  / K 0.000827** 0.000519 0.00158 0.0141 0.0871
(0.000410) (0.00109) (0.00224) (0.0157) (0.0656)
BNDES * Cash Flow  / K 0.0599 0.0549 0.198*** 0.0544 0.0836
(0.0373) (0.0370) (0.0136) (0.0452) (0.0686)
Sales / K -0.000290*** -0.000423*** -0.00186** -0.0131** -0.0417***
(3.45e-05) (0.000158) (0.000941) (0.00558) (0.00978)
Sales / K lagged in time 0.000352*** 0.000290*** 0.000856 0.000952*** 0.0344***
(1.95e-05) (2.43e-05) (0.00147) (0.000258) (0.00673)
Sector Investment 0.0898*** 0.104*** 0.00555 0.0663 -0.0233
(0.00397) (0.00630) (0.00693) (0.0442) (0.0583)
Sector Value Added Var. -0.0556*** -0.0689*** -0.0159 -0.0238 0.0400
(0.00588) (0.00932) (0.0101) (0.0669) (0.0860)
OCDE Tech. Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Multinational Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Size Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 18,038 6,419 1,181 205 128
R-squared 0.110 0.129 0.226 0.246 0.324
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1
Table A.4.b: Credit Restriction - Only 1998
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Appendix V: Post-treatment performance for alternative treated groups 
Control Group
Dependent Variable Labor TFP Labor TFP Labor TFP Labor TFP Labor TFP
Effect in 1998 0.130** -0.00728 0.0943* 0.0162 0.192*** 0.0180 0.180 0.0211 0.103 0.0176
(0.0577) (0.0466) (0.0565) (0.0451) (0.0711) (0.0477) (0.156) (0.0649) (0.102) (0.0605)
Effect in 1999 0.150*** -0.0589 0.109** -0.0210 0.183*** -0.0516 0.0303 -0.0227 0.0940 -0.0414
(0.0549) (0.0449) (0.0533) (0.0431) (0.0669) (0.0467) (0.123) (0.0609) (0.0983) (0.0587)
Effect in 2000 0.181*** -0.0764 0.130** -0.0185 0.216*** -0.0564 0.0742 -0.0383 0.194 -0.0889
(0.0562) (0.0466) (0.0550) (0.0442) (0.0698) (0.0475) (0.158) (0.0613) (0.118) (0.0595)
Effect in 2001 0.163*** -0.0839* 0.128** -0.0276 0.194*** -0.0599 0.281 0.00854 0.195* -0.0620
(0.0589) (0.0433) (0.0574) (0.0415) (0.0687) (0.0450) (0.199) (0.0587) (0.119) (0.0599)
Effect in 2002 0.169*** -0.0512 0.153*** 0.0224 0.244*** -0.0100 0.182 0.0121 0.0724 0.00629
(0.0567) (0.0455) (0.0550) (0.0442) (0.0696) (0.0471) (0.130) (0.0624) (0.0736) (0.0609)
Effect in 2003 0.126** -0.0978** 0.123** -0.0284 0.185*** -0.0823* -0.0456 -0.0402 0.104 -0.0610
(0.0529) (0.0462) (0.0511) (0.0450) (0.0642) (0.0484) (0.106) (0.0606) (0.0743) (0.0622)
Effect in 2004 0.0993* -0.106** 0.113** -0.0184 0.115* -0.0840* -0.0556 -0.0598 0.0918 -0.0664
(0.0583) (0.0442) (0.0561) (0.0429) (0.0668) (0.0465) (0.108) (0.0620) (0.0760) (0.0606)
Effect in 2005 0.0573 -0.134*** 0.0875 -0.0462 0.0919 -0.111** -0.0822 -0.0574 0.0717 -0.104*
(0.0587) (0.0434) (0.0563) (0.0417) (0.0660) (0.0456) (0.108) (0.0612) (0.0763) (0.0628)
Effect in 2006 0.0122 -0.193*** 0.0600 -0.0636 0.0719 -0.123*** -0.104 -0.115* 0.0789 -0.0791
(0.0581) (0.0457) (0.0563) (0.0439) (0.0655) (0.0472) (0.107) (0.0642) (0.0744) (0.0606)
Multiple Treatments 0.00255 0.00167 0.00657 -0.0138* 0.00347 -0.0197*** 0.0136 -0.00822 0.0120 -0.0262***
(0.00802) (0.00723) (0.00782) (0.00712) (0.00914) (0.00759) (0.00915) (0.00752) (0.0102) (0.00816)
Invest. Domestic Capital 0.0194*** -0.0147*** -0.0155 -0.144*** -0.0217
(0.00450) (0.00568) (0.0185) (0.0394) (0.0301)
Invest. Imported Capital 0.0181** 0.0143 0.0471** 0.0770** 0.0529**
(0.00904) (0.00900) (0.0231) (0.0319) (0.0225)
Imported Inputs 0.436*** 0.466*** 0.383*** 0.445*** 0.798*** 0.666*** 0.931*** 0.623*** 0.710*** 0.755***
(0.0966) (0.0369) (0.136) (0.0598) (0.251) (0.142) (0.220) (0.105) (0.199) (0.133)
Export Coeff icient 0.203*** -0.0908*** 0.106*** -0.115*** 0.274*** -0.0178 -0.00709 -0.263*** 0.118* 0.00769
(0.0384) (0.00923) (0.0363) (0.0130) (0.0524) (0.0334) (0.0788) (0.0530) (0.0662) (0.0548)
Import Coeff icient -1.211*** -0.614*** -1.238*** -0.582*** -1.558*** -0.988*** -1.568*** -0.859*** -1.156*** -1.174***
(0.163) (0.0430) (0.182) (0.0704) (0.458) (0.153) (0.510) (0.157) (0.331) (0.180)
Net Sales Revenue 0.496*** 0.0606*** 0.554*** 0.100*** 0.455*** 0.0891*** 0.543*** 0.103*** 0.584*** 0.108***
(0.00490) (0.00180) (0.00726) (0.00238) (0.0150) (0.00640) (0.0267) (0.0108) (0.0275) (0.0113)
Cost over Revenue -2.010*** -1.260*** -2.250*** -1.273*** -2.580*** -1.436*** -2.217*** -0.955*** -1.670*** -1.071***
(0.0750) (0.0248) (0.0764) (0.0276) (0.162) (0.0757) (0.268) (0.107) (0.378) (0.112)
Firms' Age -0.0175*** -0.171*** 0.0312*** -0.0535*** 0.0805*** -0.0205** -0.0496 0.0213 0.0997* 0.00228
(0.00380) (0.00216) (0.00786) (0.00360) (0.0213) (0.00982) (0.0464) (0.0212) (0.0516) (0.0193)
Years of Schooling -0.0162* -0.303*** -0.0122 -0.309*** -0.0558 -0.300*** 0.0764 -0.324*** 0.266** -0.202***
(0.00971) (0.00542) (0.0144) (0.00708) (0.0368) (0.0170) (0.0701) (0.0443) (0.115) (0.0491)
Skilled Labour 0.309*** 0.586*** 0.127*** 0.549*** 0.321* 0.495*** 0.0693 0.460*** -0.0225 0.522***
(0.0350) (0.0209) (0.0469) (0.0282) (0.169) (0.0762) (0.180) (0.112) (0.195) (0.109)
Average Salary 0.567*** 0.266*** 0.520*** 0.211*** 0.593*** 0.232*** 0.426*** 0.192*** 0.435*** 0.125***
(0.00682) (0.00332) (0.00956) (0.00420) (0.0255) (0.0114) (0.0418) (0.0212) (0.0351) (0.0209)
Investments 0.0103*** -0.0121*** 0.0112*** -0.00203*** 0.00941*** 0.000735 0.00338 -0.00199 0.00989** -0.00133
(0.000421) (0.000224) (0.000611) (0.000295) (0.00162) (0.000784) (0.00353) (0.00170) (0.00389) (0.00174)
Solvency 1.272*** 0.559*** 1.323*** 0.607*** 1.343*** 0.819*** 1.795*** 0.522*** 1.323*** 0.609***
(0.0856) (0.0327) (0.0976) (0.0379) (0.325) (0.102) (0.298) (0.173) (0.265) (0.139)
Revenue Grow th -0.461*** 0.0422*** -0.444*** 0.0304*** -0.443*** 0.0291** -0.388*** 0.0693** -0.373** 0.0437
(0.0126) (0.00412) (0.0241) (0.00615) (0.0494) (0.0143) (0.119) (0.0287) (0.145) (0.0304)
Employment Grow th 0.463*** -0.0161*** 0.451*** 0.00961 0.400*** 0.00381 0.286** -0.0338 0.478*** -0.00706
(0.0117) (0.00433) (0.0234) (0.00693) (0.0545) (0.0165) (0.131) (0.0368) (0.162) (0.0337)
Productivity Grow th 0.492*** 0.0353*** 0.475*** 0.0325*** 0.452*** 0.0272*** 0.469*** 0.0167** 0.483*** 0.0265**
(0.00995) (0.00117) (0.0206) (0.00180) (0.0421) (0.00404) (0.116) (0.00710) (0.168) (0.0134)
Profitable 0.170*** 0.0635*** 0.0907*** 0.0405*** 0.137*** 0.0503*** 0.0960*** 0.0287* 0.00363 0.0185
(0.00772) (0.00334) (0.00697) (0.00339) (0.0179) (0.0105) (0.0292) (0.0162) (0.0251) (0.0156)
Multinational 0.0506*** -0.0340*** 0.0414*** -0.0648*** -0.119*** -0.100*** -0.0859** -0.117*** -0.0659* -0.0298
(0.0109) (0.00507) (0.0114) (0.00627) (0.0383) (0.0234) (0.0378) (0.0249) (0.0371) (0.0236)
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
OCDE Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Size Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 203.418 192.97 78.137 76.878 12.22 11.811 2.698 2.674 2.336 2.317
R-squared 0.693 0.336 0.707 0.445 0.669 0.405 0.694 0.446 0.779 0.495
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A.5.a: Results of Difference-in-Differences (More  than Once)
All Firms Invested No Invest. before 98 BNDES 2007 Paired
25 
Control Group
Dependent Variable Labor TFP Labor TFP Labor TFP Labor TFP Labor TFP
Effect in 1998 0.0261 -0.0195 0.129 0.0173 0.229** 0.0226 0.230 0.0197 0.009 -0.102
(0.0822) (0.0329) (0.0865) (0.0648) (0.0946) (0.0663) (0.168) (0.0791) (0.104) (0.116)
Effect in 1999 0.0508 -0.0326 0.133* -0.0159 0.204** -0.0442 0.0578 -0.0279 -0.0456 -0.104
(0.0722) (0.0371) (0.0802) (0.0608) (0.0884) (0.0635) (0.137) (0.0735) (0.103) (0.0908)
Effect in 2000 0.0432 -0.0664* 0.106 -0.0333 0.187** -0.0683 0.0461 -0.0676 -0.0694 -0.0710
(0.0972) (0.0394) (0.0854) (0.0621) (0.0947) (0.0646) (0.172) (0.0746) (0.109) (0.0853)
Effect in 2001 0.0752 -0.0911** 0.0971 -0.0568 0.163* -0.0841 0.258 -0.0335 -0.0422 -0.121
(0.0559) (0.0377) (0.0891) (0.0603) (0.0954) (0.0628) (0.210) (0.0730) (0.112) (0.0865)
Effect in 2002 0.0710 -0.0839** 0.135 0.0168 0.216** -0.0110 0.175 -0.00557 0.0728 -0.109
(0.0510) (0.0377) (0.0845) (0.0650) (0.0952) (0.0672) (0.146) (0.0774) (0.103) (0.0917)
Effect in 2003 0.0608 -0.131*** 0.141* -0.0391 0.201** -0.0859 -0.0240 -0.0647 0.121 -0.105
(0.0516) (0.0380) (0.0779) (0.0630) (0.0862) (0.0660) (0.122) (0.0741) (0.103) (0.0821)
Effect in 2004 0.0246 -0.136*** 0.132* -0.0256 0.128 -0.0850 -0.0231 -0.0854 0.168 -0.0781
(0.0589) (0.0385) (0.0801) (0.0611) (0.0870) (0.0641) (0.122) (0.0752) (0.117) (0.0822)
Effect in 2005 0.0122 -0.170*** 0.117 -0.0547 0.124 -0.109* -0.0376 -0.0796 0.117 -0.114
(0.0498) (0.0395) (0.0796) (0.0595) (0.0852) (0.0627) (0.121) (0.0735) (0.112) (0.0824)
Effect in 2006 -0.0647 -0.248*** 0.0608 -0.0815 0.0688 -0.132** -0.0978 -0.144* 0.0128 -0.155
(0.0567) (0.0416) (0.0868) (0.0629) (0.0916) (0.0658) (0.125) (0.0783) (0.117) (0.0944)
Invest. Domestic Capital 0.0196*** -0.0138** -0.00629 -0.119** -0.0182
(0.00450) (0.00570) (0.0190) (0.0478) (0.0300)
Invest. Imported Capital 0.0186** 0.0142 0.0509** 0.0949** 0.000187
(0.00907) (0.00902) (0.0249) (0.0415) (0.0319)
Imported Inputs 0.440*** 0.467*** 0.381*** 0.445*** 0.791*** 0.676*** 0.962*** 0.676*** 0.673*** 0.711***
(0.0970) (0.0371) (0.136) (0.0600) (0.262) (0.147) (0.257) (0.108) (0.184) (0.118)
Export Coeff icient 0.206*** -0.0892*** 0.110*** -0.111*** 0.355*** 0.0295 0.107 -0.240*** -0.373*** -0.316***
(0.0387) (0.00925) (0.0367) (0.0131) (0.0567) (0.0351) (0.0940) (0.0622) (0.0943) (0.114)
Import Coeff icient -1.218*** -0.616*** -1.239*** -0.578*** -1.568*** -0.953*** -1.661*** -0.802*** -0.671** -1.011***
(0.164) (0.0432) (0.182) (0.0706) (0.480) (0.155) (0.633) (0.160) (0.278) (0.195)
Net Sales Revenue 0.495*** 0.0606*** 0.552*** 0.100*** 0.442*** 0.0865*** 0.525*** 0.110*** 0.625*** 0.108***
(0.00491) (0.00181) (0.00731) (0.00239) (0.0156) (0.00670) (0.0296) (0.0125) (0.0242) (0.0154)
Cost over Revenue -2.010*** -1.259*** -2.253*** -1.275*** -2.605*** -1.452*** -2.310*** -1.000*** -2.106*** -1.337***
(0.0750) (0.0248) (0.0767) (0.0278) (0.166) (0.0778) (0.307) (0.114) (0.221) (0.164)
Firms' Age -0.0175*** -0.170*** 0.0311*** -0.0538*** 0.0833*** -0.0217** -0.0629 0.0335 0.0840** -0.0447
(0.00380) (0.00216) (0.00791) (0.00362) (0.0220) (0.0101) (0.0588) (0.0247) (0.0334) (0.0293)
Years of Schooling -0.0171* -0.303*** -0.0144 -0.310*** -0.0674* -0.302*** 0.0600 -0.306*** -0.122 -0.365***
(0.00971) (0.00542) (0.0145) (0.00710) (0.0376) (0.0173) (0.0852) (0.0471) (0.0796) (0.0696)
Skilled Labour 0.316*** 0.588*** 0.135*** 0.552*** 0.430** 0.523*** 0.0299 0.263* 0.678*** 0.864***
(0.0351) (0.0210) (0.0475) (0.0286) (0.201) (0.0867) (0.269) (0.156) (0.185) (0.181)
Average Salary 0.567*** 0.265*** 0.521*** 0.211*** 0.608*** 0.230*** 0.425*** 0.161*** 0.287*** 0.123***
(0.00683) (0.00333) (0.00963) (0.00422) (0.0271) (0.0118) (0.0542) (0.0242) (0.0401) (0.0236)
Investments 0.0104*** -0.0121*** 0.0113*** -0.00201*** 0.00959*** 0.000920 0.00431 -0.000642 0.0150*** -9.56e-05
(0.000422) (0.000224) (0.000613) (0.000296) (0.00165) (0.000798) (0.00393) (0.00188) (0.00289) (0.00272)
Solvency 1.272*** 0.560*** 1.325*** 0.609*** 1.354*** 0.843*** 1.917*** 0.543*** 1.212*** 0.775***
(0.0855) (0.0327) (0.0980) (0.0380) (0.331) (0.105) (0.354) (0.192) (0.170) (0.136)
Revenue Grow th -0.461*** 0.0423*** -0.444*** 0.0301*** -0.444*** 0.0281* -0.394*** 0.0545 -0.343*** 0.00183
(0.0126) (0.00412) (0.0241) (0.00617) (0.0499) (0.0146) (0.130) (0.0332) (0.0729) (0.0414)
Employment Grow th 0.463*** -0.0162*** 0.452*** 0.00881 0.399*** -0.000569 0.257 -0.0884* 0.273*** -0.0425
(0.0118) (0.00433) (0.0236) (0.00699) (0.0567) (0.0172) (0.169) (0.0509) (0.0905) (0.0485)
Productivity Grow th 0.492*** 0.0353*** 0.475*** 0.0324*** 0.452*** 0.0269*** 0.471*** 0.0139** 0.411*** 0.0518**
(0.00994) (0.00117) (0.0207) (0.00180) (0.0423) (0.00406) (0.120) (0.00695) (0.0678) (0.0226)
Profitable 0.171*** 0.0638*** 0.0918*** 0.0411*** 0.150*** 0.0555*** 0.129*** 0.0408** 0.0451* 0.00104
(0.00773) (0.00335) (0.00702) (0.00341) (0.0188) (0.0110) (0.0362) (0.0184) (0.0241) (0.0241)
Multinational 0.0504*** -0.0341*** 0.0428*** -0.0651*** -0.148*** -0.0951*** -0.109* -0.141*** 0.0334 0.0597
(0.0110) (0.00510) (0.0116) (0.00638) (0.0537) (0.0338) (0.0632) (0.0387) (0.0540) (0.0503)
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
OCDE Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Size Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 203,150 192,703 77,479 76,220 11.562 11,153 2,040 2,016 1.273 1,254
R-squared 0.693 0.336 0.705 0.445 0.645 0.402 0.653 0.457 0.870 0.458
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A.5.b: Results of Difference-in-Differences (Only 1998)
All Firms Invested No Invest. before 98 BNDES 2007 Paired
Robust standard errors in parentheses
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Control Group
Dependent Variable Labor TFP Labor TFP Labor TFP Labor TFP Labor TFP
Effect in 1998 0.137** -0.00221 0.105 0.0217 0.201*** 0.0230 0.189 0.0239 0.0555 0.0430
(0.0665) (0.0522) (0.0647) (0.0497) (0.0778) (0.0517) (0.158) (0.0684) (0.0960) (0.0739)
Effect in 1999 0.160*** -0.0598 0.121** -0.0196 0.196*** -0.0527 0.0444 -0.0215 0.0425 0.00260
(0.0618) (0.0482) (0.0594) (0.0456) (0.0713) (0.0486) (0.126) (0.0626) (0.0917) (0.0691)
Effect in 2000 0.195*** -0.0844* 0.146** -0.0266 0.228*** -0.0664 0.0845 -0.0457 -0.0159 -0.000504
(0.0610) (0.0505) (0.0595) (0.0472) (0.0734) (0.0499) (0.160) (0.0631) (0.102) (0.0708)
Effect in 2001 0.161** -0.0935* 0.127** -0.0375 0.190*** -0.0717 0.281 0.000887 -0.00923 -0.00799
(0.0631) (0.0485) (0.0614) (0.0461) (0.0722) (0.0487) (0.201) (0.0617) (0.102) (0.0671)
Effect in 2002 0.158** -0.0695 0.141** 0.00287 0.228*** -0.0316 0.167 -0.0108 0.000578 0.0156
(0.0634) (0.0509) (0.0612) (0.0492) (0.0748) (0.0515) (0.132) (0.0656) (0.0974) (0.0708)
Effect in 2003 0.105* -0.107** 0.102* -0.0347 0.161** -0.0903* -0.0727 -0.0507 0.0414 -0.0292
(0.0610) (0.0514) (0.0590) (0.0500) (0.0701) (0.0527) (0.110) (0.0641) (0.0959) (0.0717)
Effect in 2004 0.0834 -0.0932* 0.0968 -0.00373 0.0982 -0.0728 -0.0746 -0.0529 0.00902 0.0355
(0.0680) (0.0497) (0.0655) (0.0475) (0.0747) (0.0505) (0.112) (0.0653) (0.0961) (0.0690)
Effect in 2005 0.0429 -0.123** 0.0763 -0.0321 0.0810 -0.0962* -0.101 -0.0494 0.0174 -0.0142
(0.0687) (0.0493) (0.0658) (0.0467) (0.0740) (0.0497) (0.113) (0.0642) (0.0943) (0.0695)
Effect in 2006 0.0196 -0.184*** 0.0707 -0.0534 0.0769 -0.112** -0.102 -0.111* -0.0211 -0.0172
(0.0667) (0.0509) (0.0649) (0.0486) (0.0725) (0.0512) (0.111) (0.0671) (0.108) (0.0699)
Multiple Treatments 0.0160 0.00623 0.0144 -0.00783 0.0125 -0.0138 0.0176 -0.0124 0.0378*** -0.0121
(0.0106) (0.00914) (0.0104) (0.00890) (0.0114) (0.00902) (0.0112) (0.00881) (0.0111) (0.00950)
Invest. Domestic Capital 0.0193*** -0.0148*** -0.0157 -0.154*** 0.0364
(0.00451) (0.00569) (0.0186) (0.0416) (0.0266)
Invest. Imported Capital 0.0183** 0.0144 0.0545** 0.0811** 0.0478
(0.00904) (0.00900) (0.0235) (0.0359) (0.0342)
Imported Inputs 0.435*** 0.466*** 0.381*** 0.445*** 0.775*** 0.666*** 0.890*** 0.659*** 0.828*** 0.696***
(0.0964) (0.0369) (0.136) (0.0598) (0.253) (0.143) (0.238) (0.104) (0.279) (0.223)
Export Coeff icient 0.205*** -0.0904*** 0.109*** -0.114*** 0.324*** -0.0108 0.0494 -0.323*** 0.263*** -0.123*
(0.0384) (0.00924) (0.0365) (0.0130) (0.0539) (0.0343) (0.0894) (0.0572) (0.0725) (0.0684)
Import Coeff icient -1.211*** -0.614*** -1.237*** -0.579*** -1.533*** -0.969*** -1.514*** -0.826*** -0.759* -1.008***
(0.163) (0.0431) (0.181) (0.0705) (0.471) (0.153) (0.580) (0.155) (0.452) (0.337)
Net Sales Revenue 0.496*** 0.0606*** 0.554*** 0.101*** 0.451*** 0.0922*** 0.542*** 0.117*** 0.593*** 0.122***
(0.00490) (0.00181) (0.00727) (0.00239) (0.0152) (0.00659) (0.0279) (0.0120) (0.0203) (0.0141)
Cost over Revenue -2.011*** -1.260*** -2.252*** -1.274*** -2.600*** -1.442*** -2.347*** -0.978*** -1.822*** -1.206***
(0.0751) (0.0249) (0.0766) (0.0277) (0.164) (0.0773) (0.291) (0.114) (0.187) (0.146)
Firms' Age -0.0175*** -0.170*** 0.0310*** -0.0529*** 0.0796*** -0.0164* -0.0560 0.0369* -0.0217 -0.0362
(0.00380) (0.00216) (0.00787) (0.00360) (0.0214) (0.00985) (0.0497) (0.0215) (0.0246) (0.0224)
Years of Schooling -0.0164* -0.303*** -0.0127 -0.308*** -0.0595 -0.290*** 0.0667 -0.254*** 0.187*** -0.248***
(0.00972) (0.00543) (0.0145) (0.00709) (0.0379) (0.0172) (0.0856) (0.0494) (0.0696) (0.0525)
Skilled Labour 0.311*** 0.585*** 0.130*** 0.548*** 0.371** 0.499*** 0.0946 0.317** 0.365** 0.405***
(0.0351) (0.0210) (0.0474) (0.0285) (0.186) (0.0829) (0.227) (0.138) (0.182) (0.132)
Average Salary 0.567*** 0.266*** 0.519*** 0.210*** 0.592*** 0.225*** 0.402*** 0.156*** 0.373*** 0.175***
(0.00683) (0.00332) (0.00957) (0.00420) (0.0260) (0.0114) (0.0443) (0.0212) (0.0285) (0.0216)
Investments 0.0103*** -0.0121*** 0.0112*** -0.00202*** 0.00938*** 0.000883 0.00319 -0.00116 0.00329 -0.000822
(0.000421) (0.000224) (0.000612) (0.000295) (0.00163) (0.000790) (0.00376) (0.00176) (0.00238) (0.00189)
Solvency 1.271*** 0.559*** 1.323*** 0.605*** 1.339*** 0.818*** 1.819*** 0.379** 1.505*** 0.746***
(0.0857) (0.0327) (0.0980) (0.0380) (0.332) (0.105) (0.351) (0.187) (0.282) (0.222)
Revenue Grow th -0.462*** 0.0423*** -0.445*** 0.0306*** -0.446*** 0.0293** -0.412*** 0.0791** -0.373*** 0.0104
(0.0126) (0.00412) (0.0241) (0.00616) (0.0498) (0.0145) (0.126) (0.0310) (0.0911) (0.0422)
Employment Grow th 0.463*** -0.0164*** 0.450*** 0.00879 0.392*** -0.00189 0.246* -0.0737* 0.397*** 0.0191
(0.0118) (0.00433) (0.0235) (0.00697) (0.0556) (0.0168) (0.145) (0.0438) (0.0931) (0.0432)
Productivity Grow th 0.492*** 0.0353*** 0.475*** 0.0325*** 0.452*** 0.0272*** 0.470*** 0.0164** 0.428*** 0.0398**
(0.00995) (0.00117) (0.0207) (0.00180) (0.0422) (0.00406) (0.118) (0.00711) (0.0677) (0.0193)
Profitable 0.171*** 0.0635*** 0.0909*** 0.0404*** 0.141*** 0.0505*** 0.103*** 0.0216 0.00879 0.0155
(0.00773) (0.00335) (0.00699) (0.00340) (0.0183) (0.0107) (0.0318) (0.0167) (0.0241) (0.0190)
Multinational 0.0516*** -0.0344*** 0.0429*** -0.0659*** -0.0906** -0.122*** -0.0614 -0.167*** -0.124** -0.0870***
(0.0110) (0.00509) (0.0114) (0.00632) (0.0441) (0.0275) (0.0481) (0.0310) (0.0526) (0.0276)
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
OCDE Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Size Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 203.128 192,684 77,847 76,592 11,930 11,525 2.408 2,388 1.747 1,783
R-squared 0.693 0.336 0.705 0.445 0.653 0.402 0.664 0.439 0.812 0.509
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A.5.c: Results of Difference-in-Differences (Automatic BNDES)
All Firms Invested No Invest. before 98 BNDES 2007 Paired
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Appendix VI: Measuring TFP à la Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) 
We have used the following variables: 
a) Labour – We use the total number of employees for each firm multiplied by
their average number of years spent on schooling as measure of human capital.
b) Capital – Sector investment from 1985 to 1995 is used to create a sector capital
stock by perpetual inventory. Sector capital stock in 1995 is allocated across
firms in 1996 based on their revenue in 1996. This gives each firm’s initial
capital stock. The initial capital stock is then added to each firm’s investment in
1996. Further accounting for depreciation gives the capital stock of each firm in
1996. From this year on, each firm’s capital stock is generated using its initial
capital stock, its investments and depreciation.
c) Input – The PIA dataset reports firm input expenditure.
d) Output – We use the total value of production as our measure of production
e) Energy – The PIA dataset reports firm energy expenditure.
The results of the TFP estimation are the following: 
Dependent Variable:







Wald Test for Constant Returns 4.54
P-value 3.3%
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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